it is clear that the more social, economic, and political progress br

is made and the more educated the Arabs become, the less satis- br

fied they will be and the more extreme, nationalistic, and an- br

tagonistic to the Jewish state.

The question of higher living standards, more integration br

and opportunities, and greater education are not the ultimate br

issues for the Arabs. The-Jewish-Arab conflict in Israel is not a br

social or economic or political one. It is much deeper than that; br

it has to do with the very definition and basis of the state. As br

long as Israel persists in defining itself de jure, officially as the br

Jewish state, as long as it adheres to the Zionist and Judaistic br

credo of the land as belonging to the Jewish people, there will be br

hatred, conflict, blood, war.

But the leaders of Israel do not have the courage to say this. br

They persist in their ultimately catastrophic delusion that the br

solution to the Arab problem in Israel is greater progress toward br

social and economic equality, integration, and “goodwill.”

And so, on June 19, 1976, the prime minister of Israel, br

Yitzhak Rabin, Defense Minister Shimon Peres, former Foreign br

Minister Abba Eban, a large gathering of Israeli top leadership, br

and hand-picked “loyal” Israeli Arabs met for a day-long sym- br

posium on the “Arab problem.” It was less than three months br

after the Land Day Rebellion, and the shaken country had seen br

debates, articles, government meetings, studies, speeches, sym- br

posiums—all devoted to dissecting the “suddenly” angry Israeli br

Arab. The question on the lips of all worried Jews was: What br

makes Ahmed suddenly run wild? And, more important: How br

can we stop him?

Just a few years earlier, the frantic questions would not br

even have been raised. A fascinating example of the almost un- br

believable Israeli delusion is to be found in an article written by br

Edwin Samuel in the May 1955 issue of the then prestigious br

Commentary magazine. Samuel, son of Viscount Herbert Samuel, br

the first British high commissioner for Palestine, wrote as an br

Israeli citizen and expert on Arab affairs. What did an Israeli br

expert write in those halcyon days when, like all good Arabs, the br

Israeli ones were seen, here and there, but seldom heard?

“With an overwhelming Jewish majority, it is extremely br

doubtful whether a separate Arab culture can be maintained. It br

seems more than probable—even if the Arab population reaches br