wanted: Knesset votes and submission. Of course, the old men br

hated the Jews, but their guiding light was “What is good for br

me?” They had little patience with and less understanding of br

national aspirations, and, of course, any talk of social and eco- br

nomic reform was anathema to them.

The Israeli authorities in those years followed a two- br

pronged policy: a military administration that severely restrict- br

ed movement and unauthorized political activity, and, on the br

other hand, a close working relationship with the old men of the br

hamullas. Large amounts of money went into patriarchal pockets, br

and development funds were generously granted to “deserving” br

villages. The Labor Party ingeniously created two Arab br

“parties,” both faithful hamulla-led puppets, known as Progress br

and Development and the List of Bedouins and Villagers. But all br

Israeli parties tried their hand at buying Arab votes through the br

venal old men. Thus, few found it odd that the Jewish National br

Religious Party was able to garner votes in Arab villages. It was br

hardly ideology but rather a clear indication of the real reason br

for the apparent Arab “acceptance of” and “identification with” br

the state of the Jews. It was not loyalty to Israel but an “Uncle br

Ahmed” mentality typical of early stages of minority submission.

Of course, it had to end. The fraud of Israeli Arab accep- br

tance of Israel was built on the fact of the feudal structure of the br

Arab villages. But the days of that reactionary anachronism br

were numbered, and ironically, it was the Israeli government br

that, having the most to gain from its perpetuation, destroyed it.

There is nothing more menacing to entrenched, con- br

servative feudalists than social and economic change, but that is br

precisely what Israeli society and governmental policies brought br

about in the villages. The very Arab educational revolutions of br

which Israel boasts have destroyed the authority of the hamulla br

leaders by creating an educated, radical class that questions all br

the social, political, and economic axioms upon which the ruling br

patriarchs based their authority. It is not only that education br

opened up windows to the world and allowed the young Arab to br

see a vast spectrum of other social structures. It is not only that br

education exposed young Arabs to radical, leftist, revolutionary br

views that called for the overthrow of feudal privilege. It is br

deeper than that.

Education—along with the fact that the young Arab was br